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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Bills and Notes - Drawer's Right Against Drawee After Payment on
a Forged Indorsement - Klessig, agent for the Modern Woodmen of
America, handled funds including insurance premiums for said organ-
ization in Milwaukee, and deposited such fundls with defendant bank in
the agent's name. At the end of each month Klessig sent a monthly
statement of all receipts to the national organization in Illinois, accom-
pained by a check payable to said organization drawn on defendant
bank, for the total amount of said statement. In May of 1941 Klessig
submitted his report with a check for $4,753.36. The Modern Woodmen
presented the check to their bank in Chicago, and the latter dishonored
the check because of insufficient funds. In the meantime the national
organization mailed Klessig a check for $1000 payable to one Catherine
Niebler for insurance benefits due her. Klessig forged the necessary
indorsement and deposited the check with defendant bank thus making
the account in the bank sufficient for payment of the outstanding check.
When this check was again presented to the bank by the Modern
Woodmen of America, it was honored. Upon an auditor's check-up
of Klessig's accounts, the latter was removed from office, and the
plaintiff, as surety on a bond indemnifying the society against forgery,
paid the society its $1000 loss. Plaintiff, surety company, sued the
defendant bank. Held: that defendant bank was not liable for paying
on the forged indorsement, since the forgery had not caused the loss
sustained by the Modern Woodmen of America. National Surety
Corporation v. City Bank and Trust Company (Wis. 1945), 20 N. W.
2d. 559.
The general rule is that a bank must bear the loss when it pays
on a forged indorsement.1 But, in the case under consideration there
is a qualification of that rule. In the instant case the proximate cause
for the loss suffered by the drawer was the misappropriation of its
money by its agent, Klessig. At the time Klessig forged the check
the loss had already been incurred. The payment by the bank merely
postponed detection of the loss. Generally a bank is liable to the
drawer of a check for paying it on a forged indorsement, in the
absence of estoppel, contributing negligence or ratification, or unless
the money has reached the intended person.2 By the same token,
if the proceeds of the forged check ultimately reach the drawer, the
bank should also be relieved from liability. The Kentucky court
has said if the depositor has actually received the proceeds of the
check, the fact that the check was forged does not render the bank
responsible for the amount.3 However, a New York court reached a
17 Am. Tur. section 587, page 425; 9 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 730.
2 Board of Education of Jefferson Tp. v. National Union Bank of Dover, 1 A.
2d. 383, 121 N.J.L. 177, affirming 196 A. 352, 16 N. J. Misc. 50 (1938) ; Seid-
man v. North Camden Trust Co.. 7 A. 2d 406, 122 N.J.L. 580 (1939).
3 Phoenix Nat. Bank v. Taylor, 67 S.W. 27, 113 Ky. 61, 23 Ky. L. 2307 (1902).
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RECENT DECISIONS
different decision. In the New York case4 the name of the plaintiff
firm on a check was forged by its confidential bookkeeper-. The
check was drawn upon defendant bank to order of another bank
and deposited in such other bank to credit of plaintiff and paid by
the defendant. The court said that the forgery should have been
discovered by the defendant and that the deposit could not be deemed
a payment to plaintiff, where the payment of the forged check enabled
the bookkeeper to cover up his defalcations. The court stated:
"Defendant's payment of the forged check enabled Pratt,
(confidential bookkeeper) not only to cover up his defalcations
up to July, 1917, for an indefinite period, but enabled him
thereafter to increase his ill-gotten gains by a sum in excess
of the $5,000 check deposited in the Bank of New York. The
plaintiff thus derived no benefit whatever from this deposit -. "5
This case seems to be just the converse of the instant case. There
is, however, a distinction. In the instant case the proceeds of the
forged check made restitution for past defaults while in the New York
case' the proceeds of the check enabled the bookkeeper not only to
conceal prior defaults but also subsequent defalcations.
There is a Minnesota case in which the factual situation was
almost identical with the instant case. In the Minnesota case 6 the
plaintiffs drew a check payable to a customer to whom they were
indebted, and forwarded the same to their agent, to be delivered
to the payee. The agent forged the payee's name to an indorsement
of the check, and deposited it in a bank to his own credit, paying
the proceeds thereof to the plaintiffs with other money in settlement
of a shortage in his accounts. The drawee bank paid the check on the
forged indorsement in the ordinary course of business. The court
stated that the plaintiffs, as drawers, were not entitled to recover
the amount of the check from the bank, since the proceeds thereof
came back to them, and the debt of their agent remained unpaid.
They suffered no damage by reason of the payment of the check by
the bank. The language of the court was as follows:
"The appellants (drawers) made an ingenious argument, but
the result which they desire to bring about would be so unjust
and inequitable as to suggest a fallacy lurks somewhere in the
process of reasoning. The appellants have not been injured
by the fact that the Northwestern National Bank (drawee)
paid this check upon a forged indorsement, and their theory,
if accepted, would merely result in substituting the bank for
4 Stumpp v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 178 N.Y.S. 811, 109 'Misc. 24 (1919).
5 Ibid., page 812.
6 Andrews v. Northwestern National Bank, 117 N.W. 621. 107 Minn. 196, 25
L.R.A. (N.s.) 996, rehearing 117 N.W. 780, 107 Minn. 196, 25 L.R.A. (N.s.)
996, and judgment affirmed (1908).
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the defaulting employee as the creditor of Andrews and Gage
(appellants) ."7
This case seems to be one of first impression passing upon the
question as to the effect of proximate cause in the application of the
general rule that a bank, and not the depositor, must sustain the loss
when the bank pays on a forged indorsement.
However, an opposite conclusion was reached by a South Carolina
case8 where the drawer's agent forged the payee's indorsement, in-
dorsed as agent, and used the proceeds of the check to pay an indebted-
ness to his principal. It was held this did not bar the drawer's action
against the bank. The court applied the general rule and ignored the
factor of causation of loss. In the cases cited in the court's opinion
the drawer had never regained the money in any manner. Each
drawer had suffered a loss as a direct result of the drawee paying
on a forged indorsement. But, in the South Carofina case the drawer
suffered no loss as a result of the bank's payment. Its loss was
occasioned by the defaults of its agent which had occured long before
the bank paid the forged check.
The decision of the Wisconsin case and the Minnesota case sup-
porting it seem to be more reasonable and just. It is submitted that
the Wisconsin Court, in determining the liability of a bank for pay-
ment on a forged indorsement, will require that the payment be the
proximate cause of the loss for which recovery is sought.
KATHLEEN LANDMAN
7Ibid., page 623.
8 Life Insurance Company of Virginia v. Edisto National Bank of Orangeburg
et al., 165 S.E. 178 (S. Car., 1932).
[Vol. 30
